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The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S. C. ff 1602 et seq.
("FSIA "), provides the exclusive basis for suing a foreign sovereign in
United States courts. While the ESIA generally grants immunity to foreign
sovereigns, it also lays out a number of exceptions under which U.S. courts
can exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have thus used this statute as a basis to
sue foreign governments and their agencies and instrumentalities in a
variety of contexts, rangingfrom purely commercial disputes to wrongful
death claims on behalf of victims of state-sponsored terrorism. The
purpose of this Review is to provide an overview of the primary areas of
litigation under the FSIA through an analysis of judicial decisions under
the statute issued in 2008.
INTRODUCTION: THE FSIA IN 2008

LITIGATION

involving foreign sovereigns inl the United States is

on the rise. In the past ten years, the number of reported deci-

sions discussing the FSIA has increased by nearly seventy percent.
Thsdramatic increase is attributable to a variety of circumstances that
continued to play out in FSIA jurisprudence in 2008.
The continued globalization of business and the increased use of international arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism (with enforcement
left to domestic courts) have resulted in an increase in purely commercial
litigation involving foreign states. Thus, much litigation in 2008 centered
around the "commercial activity" exception under the FSIA, including
the pivotal questions of whether acts are "governmental" or "commercial" when undertaken by sovereign entities or their agencies and instrumentalities, and how close a nexus such acts must have to the United
States to fall within the statute. While the courts continue to grapple with
these issues, the decisions in 2008 have provided some additional guidance in this constantly evolving area of the FSIA.
Another significant trend in 2008 was the continued growth in cases
arising out of the 1996 "Terrorism Exception" to the FSIA, which authorized U.S. victims to sue foreign governments (and their agents) designated by the U.S. as "state sponsors of terrorism" for "personal injury or
death" caused or sponsored by the defendants.' Terrorism-related litiga1. More than thirty-five percent of all reported FSIA decisions in 2008 involved terrorism-related claims-an increase of more than fifteen percent from 2002 and
nearly twenty-five percent from 1998.
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tion is likely to increase further, given the passage in 2008 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("NDAA"), 2 which, for
the first time, established a federal private right of action against terrorist
states, and authorized punitive damages, in addition to damages for property loss.
Overall, FSIA cases in 2008 continued to address the core issues facing
foreign sovereigns in U.S. litigation, including:
* Who is a "foreign state" subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts?
* What acts are sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to move forward with
U.S. litigation against foreign sovereign entities?
* When may plaintiffs pursue foreign sovereign assets located in the
U.S. to satisfy U.S. court judgments?
This Review will focus on the answers to those questions provided by
U.S. courts in 2008. In addition, the Review includes a brief introduction
to the statute, as well as some practical litigation guidance for foreign
sovereigns derived from the most recent FSIA cases. If you have any
questions about the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, please do not
hesitate to contact Crowell & Moring's International Dispute Resolution
litigation team:
Stuart H. Newberger
snewberger@crowell.com
(p)202.624.2649

Laurel Pyke Malson
lmalson@crowell.com
(p) 202.624.2576

Michael L Martinez
mmartinez@crowell.com
(p) 202.624.2945

Aryeh S. Portnoy
aportnoy@crowell.com
(p)202.624.2806

Katherine J. Nesbitt
knesbitt@crowell.com
(p)202.624.2678

Usa Savitt
Isavitt@crowell.com
() 202,624.2761

Daniel Vielleville
dvielleville@crowell.com
(p) 202.624.2768

John L Murino
jmurino@crowell.com
(p) 202.624.2663

Birgit Kurtz
bkurtz@crowell.com
(p)212.803.4016

Pieter H.F. Bekker
pbekker@crowell.com
(p) 212.895.4,305

William J. McSherry Jr.
wmcsherry@crowell.com
(p) 212.895.4207

Kimberley Chen Nobles
knobles@crowell.com
(p)949.263.8400

Jane Wessel
Jwessel@crowell.com
(p)+44.207.413.0071

Emmanuel Gybels
egybela@crowell.com
(p)+32.2.282.4082

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FSIA
Foreign sovereigns have enjoyed immunity from suit in U.S. courts for
nearly two centuries. As early as 1812 in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,3 U.S. courts generally declined to assert jurisdiction over cases involving foreign government defendants, a practice rooted in a sense of
"grace and comity" between the U.S. and other nations. Judges instead
deferred to the views of the Executive Branch as to whether such cases
should proceed in U.S. courts, exercising jurisdiction only where the U.S.
2. Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3 (2008).
3. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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4
State Department expressly referred claims for their consideration.
In 1952, U.S. courts' jurisdiction over claims against foreign states and
their agents expanded significantly when the U.S. State Department issued the so-called "Tate Letter," announcing the Department's adoption
of a new "restrictive theory" of foreign sovereign immunity 5 to guide
courts in invoking jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. The "Tate Letter"
directed that state sovereigns continue to be entitled to immunity from
suits involving their sovereign, or "public," acts. However, acts taken in a
commercial, or "private," capacity no longer would be protected from
U.S. court review. Yet, even with this new guidance, courts continued to
seek the Executive Branch's views on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether to assert jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns-a system that
risked inconsistency and susceptibility to "diplomatic pressures rather
6
than to the rule of law."1
In 1976, Congress sought to address this problem by enacting the FSIA,
essentially codifying the "restrictive theory" of immunity, and empowering the courts to resolve questions of sovereign immunity without resort
to the Executive Branch. 7 Today, the FSIA provides the "sole basis" for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in U.S. courts.8
The FSIA provides that "foreign states"-including their "political subdivisions" and "agencies or instrumentalities" 9-shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of the exceptions to immunity set
forth in the statute applies.' 0 The FSIA includes several provisions that
define the scope of a foreign state's immunity, and establishes detailed
procedural requirements for filing claims against a sovereign defendant.
The exceptions to immunity are set forth in Sections 1605 and 1607 of
the FSIA. These exceptions include, inter alia, certain claims based on
commercial activities, expropriation of property, and tortuous or terrorist
acts by foreign sovereign entities. In most instances, where a claim falls
under one of the FSIA exceptions, the Act provides that the foreign state
shall be subject to jurisdiction in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual." The FSIA also includes separate provisions establishing immunity (and exceptions to immunity) from the attachment of
property located in the United States in aid of execution of a judgment
against a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities.'12 Finally, the

4. Verlinden B.y. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
5. Id.
6. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Chiudian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 1990)).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
8. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1603.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1606; but see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1610-1611. For example, property belonging to a foreign central bank
or monetary authority and held for its own account is immune from suit absent a
waiver. Likewise, military property held by a military authority and used or intended to be used in connection with a military activity is immune from attachment. Id.

20101
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FSIA sets forth various unique procedural rules for claims against foreign
states, including, e.g., special rules for service of process, default judgments and appeals.' 3
11.

THE DEFINITION OF A FOREIGN STATE: POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, ORGANS, AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES

As in previous years, much of FSIA litigation in 2008 dealt with the
threshold issue of whether an entity qualifies as a "foreign state," and
therefore is entitled to immunity (or subject to the exceptions to immunity) under the FSIA. 1 4 For FSIA purposes, "foreign states" include not
only the states themselves, but also political subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities thereof.' 5 To qualify as an "agency or instrumentality"
of a foreign state, an entity must be a "separate legal person" that is
"neither a citizen of a State of the United States .. . nor created under the
laws of any third country" and either "an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision"~ or "a majority of whose shares or other ownership inter16
est is owned by a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof."1

A.

WHAT IS A "FOREIGN STATE?"

Whether an entity qualifies as a foreign state is a fundamental inquiry
in any FSIA case because it dictates whether the court will be able to
assert jurisdiction over the claim. If an entity is deemed to be a foreign
state-even as a political subdivision or an agency or instrumentality-it
may be sued in a U.S. court only if the claim falls within one of the narrow exceptions set forth in the statute.
Courts have applied various factors and tests to resolve the question
whether an entity falls within the FSIA's definition of a foreign state. In
some cases, courts look simply to the nature of the entity (or individual)
being sued, or even how the entity has been treated by others, to determine whether it should be entitled to the protections of the FSIA. In
other cases, courts apply specific tests to determine whether one or more
elements of the definition of "foreign state" have been satisfied. For example, in considering whether an entity qualifies as an "organ"~ of the
sovereign, courts have applied a five-factor analysis, considering:
(1) whether the foreign state created the entity for a national purpose; (2) whether the foreign state actively supervises the entity; (3)
whether the foreign state requires the hiring of public employees and
pays their salaries; (4) whether the entity holds exclusive rights to
some right in the [foreign] country; and (5) how the entity is treated
13. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1608.
14. In rare cases, a defendant will resist a finding of sovereign status, in order to avoid
application of the FSIA. This scenario is most likely where the FSIA provides the
only basis for jurisdiction over the defendant.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
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under foreign state law.' 7
In all cases, the court's analysis is based on the same underlying principle-consistent with the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity-that
immunity from jurisdiction should be limited to entities and acts of a public or governmental nature, but should not extend to predominantly commercial entities or conduct. This inevitably requires the court to engage
in a highly fact-intensive analysis, involving careful attention to the specific nature and functions of each defendant in order to make a preliminary determination regarding whether to allow the case to proceed.
The following is a brief review of 2008 decisions that helps to illustrate
how U.S. courts have addressed the status of a variety of entities under
the FSIA.
1. Entities that Qualified as a Foreign State. Agency or Instrumentality
Individual Officers Acting in Their Official Capacity. Courts have
issued conflicting decisions regarding whether individual officers fall
within the scope of the FSIA as "agents" of a foreign state. In 2008, the
Second Circuit in In re TerroristAttacks on September 11, 2001 joined the
majority of circuits in holding that individual officers qualify as "agents"
for immunity purposes when they act in an official capacity within the
scope of their employment.' 8 The court noted that circuits are split on
this issue, citing the Seventh Circuit's continuing refusal to extend sovereign immunity to individual agents of foreign governments. 1 9 However,
the court adopted the majority view, as set forth in the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Chuidan v. Philippine Nat'l Bank,2 0 that extending immunity
to individuals acting in their official capacity conforms with common-law
precedent, the FSIA's legislative history, and the plain language of the
statute. The court reasoned that because the term "agency" includes
"any thing or person through which action is accomplished," the statute
should grant senior members of a foreign state's government and secretariat sovereign immunity for their official acts. 2 1
Foreign Sovereigns Recognized by U.S. The Sixth Circuit in O'Bryan
v. Holy See, 22 found the Holy See to be entitled to sovereign status under
17. Ocean Line Holdings Ltd. v. China Nat'l Chartering Corp., 578 F. Supp. 2d 621,
624 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Filler v. Hanvit Bank, 378 F.3d 213, 217 (2d Cir.
2004)) (citations omitted); Intelsat Global Sales & Mktg., Ltd. v. Community of
Yugoslav Posts Telegraphs & Telephones, 534 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing
Peninsula Asset Mgmt. v. Hankook Tire Co., 476 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2007)).
18. 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008).
19. Id. at 81 (citing Enalioro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2005)).
20. 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
21. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 85. The court found
additional support for this conclusion in the newly amended FSIA Terrorism Exception. discussed more fully infra at Section IIIF., which expressly removes immunity for individuals acting in their official capacities in certain terrorism cases.
The court reasoned, by implication, that where the Terrorism Exception does not
apply-and in the absence of any other applicable exception-such individuals must
be entitled to immunity from suit under the FSIA.
22. 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009).

2010]
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the FSLA, observing that the United States currently conducts diplomatic
relations with the Holy See and recognizes it as a foreign sovereign. The
court held, however, that the Holy See may yet be subject to suit, depending on the nature of its actions, including the extent to which it acted
in a private capacity as an unincorporated association, or even as the
head of an international religious organization.
Corporations Jointly-Owned by Multiple Governments. In United
Arab Shipping Company v. Eagle Systems, Inc.,2 3 a U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia held that a foreign corporation created by treaty that was wholly-owned by multiple foreign governments
qualified as a "foreign state" under the FSIA, even though no single nation possessed a majority of the ownership interest. 24 The defendant,
United Arab Shipping Company (UASC), was a corporation created pursuant to treaty and owned jointly by Bahirain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Emirates. Although some courts have adhered
closely to the statutory language requiring the entity to be owned by "a"
foreign state, 2 5 -that is, a single foreign state-the court determined that
these six foreign nations could "pool" their ownership interests such that
the corporation still qualifies as a "foreign state" under the FSIA.
2.

Entities That Failed to Qualify as Foreign States, Agencies or
Instrumentalities

Quasi-Public University. In Santilli v. Cardone,2 6 an Italian university
claimed immunity from suit as a "foreign state" because of its close ties to
the Italian government. The university's president attested that (a) the
university had been re-established in 1964 by the Italian Government; (b)
it received approximately seventy-five percent of its funding from the
Italian Government; (c) the Italian Government oversaw and controlled
the university's budget; and (d) the university was required to account to
the Government for its spending. Despite these facts, the court refused
to grant immunity to the university, finding no evidence that (1) the university's purpose of teaching and conducting research served a national
purpose; (2) the Italian Government actively supervised the university or
required it to hire public employees; (3) the university held any exclusive
rights; or (4) Italian law treated the university as dependent upon the
Government. 2 7 Applying the five-factor analysis for determining
whether an entity is an "organ"~ of a foreign state, see supra at Section
II.A., the court found that the university was not an agency or instrumen23. No. CV408 067, 2008 WL 4087121 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 2, 2008).
24. Id. at *1 (citing In re Air Crash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind. on Oct. 31, 1994, 96
F.3d 932, 937-39 (7th Cir. 1996); LeDonne v. Gulf Air, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1400, 1406
(E.D. Va. 1988); Ahmed v. United Airlines, Inc., No. C97-4666, 1998 WL 289294, at
*2-3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1998); In re EA L Corp., No. 93 578, 1994 WL 828320, at
*4 (D. Del. Aug. 3, 1994)).
25. See, e.g., United Arab Shipping Co. v. AI-Hashim, 574 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1st Dep't
1991).
26. No. 8:07-cv-308-T-23MSS, 2008 WL 2790242, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2008).
27. Id.
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tality of the Italian government entitled to immunity from suit under the
FSIA.
Agencies of Governments Not Recognized by the United States. In
Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., 28 a U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (PA) did not qualify as "foreign states" entitled to sovereign
immunity. 29 The court found that Palestine's statehood was not recognized by the U.S. or as a matter of international law. The court further
rejected the argument that the PA was entitled to immunity as a political
subdivision of Israel because the Israeli Government and the Israeli Supreme Court had rejected that proposition.
National Sports-Related Entities. In Scheidmann v. Qatar Football
Association, the federal court for the Southern District of New York refused to exercise jurisdiction over defendants Qatar Football Association
("OFA") and Qatar National Olympic Committee ("QNOC") because
the plaintiff proffered insufficient evidence to show that the entities were
"organs" of the Qatar Government. 30 Thus, despite evidence that: (a)
members of the Qatari royal family held positions in the OFA; (b) some
QFA and QNOC salaries were budgeted as "government expenditures;"
(c) QFA and ONOC's mailing addresses were found on a website listing
government post office boxes; and (d) QFA had "exclusive rights" to
market the Qatar Football League, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument for jurisdiction based on the defendants' alleged "organ" status because neither defendant "[had been] created exclusively to serve [a]
national purpose. ...
[or held] exclusive rights in the state of Qatar . ... "13,
In fact, the court found that "both entities [were] treated as independent
entities under the law of Qatar" and thus were neither "organs" nor an
"alter-ego" of the government subject to the FSIA. 32 Without the FSIA
as a basis for jurisdiction over the defendants, the court dismissed the
claims.
B.

"GOVERNMENTAL" VERSUS "COMMERCIAL" AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES:

THE "CORE FUNCTIONS TEST"

Agency or instrumentalities deemed "foreign states" under the FSIA,
however, still may be subject to varying rules, depending on the nature of
the entity and its conduct. The FSIA and other procedural rules allow,
e.g., for more liberal treatment of agencies and instrumentalities than
their sovereign counterparties with respect to such issues as service of
process, proper venue, available damages (in particular, punitive damages, which rarely are available against foreign states but may be awarded
28. 583 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
29. Id.
30. No. 04 Civ. 3432, 2008 WL 144846 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008).

31. Id.
32. Id.

at
at

*3.
*4.
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33
against agencies or instrumentalities), and attachment of assets.
To determine whether an entity, despite its agency or instrumentality
status, should be treated as if it were part of the foreign state itself, rather
than simply an agency or instrumentality, courts apply the so-called "core
functions test."13 4 Thbus, if the entity's predominant activities, or "core
functions," are "governmental" in character, courts will treat the entity as
if it were the state itself, applying rules more protective of the sovereign
regarding, e.g., service, venue, damages, and attachment. 35 However, if
the entity's "core functions" are predominantly commercial in character,
courts will apply the less protective standards reserved for commercial
36
agencies and instrumentalities of the state.
Two cases in 2008 demonstrate the significance of this distinction. First,
in Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia addressed the question of whether, for purposes of awarding punitive damages, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) should be treated like the Iranian state itself or, instead, a
mere agency or instrumentality thereof. 3 7 The court noted that punitive
damages are not available against foreign states or "against divisions of a
foreign state that are considered to be the state itself," but are available
against an agent or instrumentality of a foreign state acting in a commercial capacity. 3 8 Applying the "core functions test" to the IRGC's activities, the court held that, despite the IRGC's use of its status as a
paramilitary organization for pecuniary gain through commercial enterprises, including engineering businesses, drug and alcohol smuggling, and
business activities in the oil sector, the IROC's "core functions" were not
commercial. Because the IRGC's core functions were "governmental" in
nature and not "commercial," the court refused to award punitive
damages.
In Baumel v. Syrian Arab Republic, the court also applied the "core
functions test" to determine the proper treatment of governmental agents
for purposes of service of process. 3 9 In that case, the District of Columbia federal district court held that Syria's President, various former and
current foreign ministers and a former high-ranking military officer
should be treated like the state, because the officials' core functions were
of a "governmental" character. Accordingly, these agents were entitled
to the more protective service rules applicable to foreign sovereigns
rather than the less protective standards for agencies and instrumentalities thereof.

33. See e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a)-(b) (service of process); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f)(3) (permitting venue in suits against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state "in
any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do business or is doing business"); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)-(b) (attachment of assets).
34. Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

35. Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
575 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D.D.C. 2008).
28 U.S.C. § 1606.
550 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2008).
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EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL GRANT OF IMMUNITY

Once a court determines that a defendant is a "foreign state" subject to
the FSIA, it must next determine whether one of the exceptions to the
general grant of immunity applies. These exceptions-found primarily in
Section 1605 of the statute-are the most litigated provisions of the FSIA.
In 2008, courts continued to focus heavily on the terrorism exception
(which was further amended by an Act of Congress). However, several
other exceptions drew attention from both appellate and district courts,
providing further guidance as to the scope of foreign state immunity in
disputes involving treaties, contractual waivers of immunity, arbitration
agreements, commercial claims and torts occurring in the United States.

A.

WAIVER AND TREATIES-§ 1605(A)(1)

A foreign sovereign may waive its immunity from suit in the U.S. either
explicitly or implicitly. 40 These waivers often take the form of an agreement in a contract to arbitrate or to adjudicate disputes in a United States
venue or in accordance with U.S. laws. 4 1 In 2008, courts continued to
uphold the long-settled principle that any waiver of immunity "is to be
construed narrowly and in light of the requirement that the foreign state
must have intended to waive its sovereign immunity."142
No Waivers for Third Parties. Consistent with the courts' historically
narrow interpretation of supposed waivers of immunity, the court in Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, held that a contractual waiver of immunity does not apply to benefit third parties that are not signatories to the
contract containing the waiver. 43 In Heroth, the Saudi Government entered into an agreement with the U.S. Government that stipulated that all
disputes under the agreement would be resolved under U.S. procurement
law. The court held that, while the Saudi Government waived its immunity with respect to the parties to the agreement (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia), the waiver did not extend to a dispute between the Saudi
Government and a separate U.S. contractor hired under the agreement,
but who had not signed the underlying contract. In the absence of contractual privity between the foreign sovereign and the plaintiff, Saudi
Arabia retained its immunity from suit.
International Agreements as Waivers. Another common issue raised
in 2008 was whether actions pursuant to international treaties and conventions serve as implicit waivers. In Good v. Fuji Fire & Marine,44 an
American woman sued multiple Japanese ministries, claiming that the
Japanese Government waived the ministries' immunity when it served
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
41. See, e.g., Lasheen V. Loomis Co., No. Civ. S-01-227, 2008 WL 295079, *3 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 1, 2008).
42. Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2008).
43. Id.
44. 271 Fed. Appx. 756 (10th Cir. 2008).
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process on them pursuant to the Hague Service Convention. 4 5 The Tenth
Circuit held that Japan did not waive immunity for its ministries merely
by acting in accordance with international law. In another case, Auster v.
Ghana Airways, Ltd.,4 6 the D.C. Circuit declined to decide whether a
Ghana-owned airline had waived its sovereign immunity by signing the
Warsaw Convention-an international agreement establishing a carrier's
liability for the death or wounding of a passenger in international transportation. However, the court implied that an international agreement,
to constitute a waiver under § 1605(a)(1), must clearly and unambigu47
ously waive immunity to suit in U.S. courts.
B.

COMMERCIAL

Ac-riviry-§ 1605(A)( 2 )

With the continued globalization of business and the increased involvement of governments in commercial affairs the "commercial activity" exception of the FSIA continues to be a frequently invoked basis for U.S.
courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. This exception to
foreign sovereign immunity provides that a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts in any case:
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United

States

... 48

In short, a foreign state is not immune from suit in the U.S. where its
actions are (1) commercial; and (2) are carried out, or cause a direct effect, in the United States.
1. What Acts are Considered Commercial?
In distinguishing between commercial and sovereign acts, the FSIA requires that acts be defined by their nature, not their purpose. 4 9 For example, the act of entering into a construction contract is commercial in
nature, even if the contract is for a seemingly sovereign, non-commercial
purpose - like building an embassy compound. However, most cases addressing this exception have not been so straightforward. In 2008, many
45. Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 361; 658 U.N.T.S. 163, T.I.A.S.
No. 6638.
46. 514 F.3d 44 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
47. See id. at 46 (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 442-43 (1989) (finding no waiver under § 1605(a)(1) when an international
agreement did not mention "a waiver of immunity to suit in United States
courts"), and World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 F.3d 1154,
1162 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("a foreign sovereign will not be found to have waived its
immunity unless it has clearly and unambiguously done so")).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
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courts grappled with the question of where to draw the line between
"commercial" and "governmental" acts. The following cases illustrate
some of the nuances identified by the courts in drawing this boundary.
Military contracts with a private company. Commercial. In UNC
Lear Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 5 0 the Saudi Arabian Goverment hired an American company to service and maintain its fleet of
F-5 aircraft. The District Court for the Western District of Texas found
that, while maintaining an air force typically is a sovereign act, the commercial activity exception applied here because Saudi Arabia had "ventured into the marketplace" to contract for maintenance services in the
same manner as a private party would.
Military contracts under a government program: Non-commercial.
Like the court in UNC Lear Services, the D.C. district court in Heroth v.
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia5 l considered whether entering into a contract
to provide services to the Saudi military was "commercial" or "governmental" activity. In Heroth, however, the Saudi Government did not contract directly with a private company. Instead, it utilized the U.S.
Government's Foreign Military Sales ("FMS") program, a mechanism by
which the U.S. Government sells defense articles and services exclusively
to foreign governments. As part of the contract, a private U.S. firm was
hired to provide military base security for the Saudi Government. When
employees of that U.S. contractor attempted to sue the Saudi Government, the court precluded them from using the commercial activity exception. It held that, since participation in the FMS was limited to
governments, and was not the type of activity in which a private actor
could participate, the contract was not commercial in nature. Furthermore, the court added, provision of security at a military facility is a
"quintessentially sovereign activity." 5 2
Charitable Contracts: Commercial. In Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq,53 Iraq contracted to purchase merchandise from the plaintiff
as part of the Oil-for-Food Programme. When Iraq was unable to perform, the plaintiff sued. Iraq argued that, since the Oil-for-Food Programme was humanitarian in nature, it fell outside of the commercial
activity exception. The court rejected this argument, finding that, regardless of the contract's purpose, Iraq had entered into a commercial transaction, just like any other private party-which therefore constituted a
"commercial" act.
Charitable Donations. Non-commercial. By contrast, in In re Terrorist
50. No. SA 04-CA-1008,

2008 WL 2946059 (W.D. Tex. July 25, 2008).

51. 565 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2008).
52. Id. at 68 n.9. The court's reasoning raises the question: If the Saudi Government
had contracted for security services in the marketplace, outside of the FMS program, would it then fall within the commercial activity exception, like the contract
in UNC Lear, or would the "quintessentially sovereign" nature of providing military security override the commercial nature of the act? The D.C. District Court
left this issue open for future determination.
53. 573 F. Supp. 2d 781 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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2001,51
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the Second Circuit held that donating

money to charities that funneled support to Al Qaeda was not a commercial activity. The plaintiffs argued that the act of giving money to a charity was commercial in nature because it was something private parties
could engage in-as opposed to an activity strictly reserved for sovereigns.
The court rejected this analysis, focusing instead on whether the defendants' acts were the "type of actions by which a private party engages in
trade and traffic or commerce."15 5 The court found that while the act of
donating money to charity is something a private party has the power to
do, it is not "part of the trade and commerce engaged in by a merchant in
56
the marketplace," and is therefore not commercial in nature. 1
Contract to Service a Foreign Government's Health Care Program:
Commercial. The District Court for the Eastern District of California
held in Lasheen v. Loomis Co. 57 that the defendant's provision of "administrative services" for the Egyptian Government's health care benefits
plan was commercial in nature because "[p]rivate companies often make
similar arrangements; undertaking such conduct does not require the ex58
ercise of the power of a sovereign nation."1
Government Employee's Servicing of a Foreign Government's Health
Care Program: Non-commercial. In Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt.
Co. v. Loderhose,5 9 the plaintiff sued the administering agency for Indonesia's social security health care program, claiming it had negligently supervised an employee who had perpetrated an elaborate scam, causing
damages. The court held that it could not exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant because, among other things, the employee's work was not
commercial in nature. The court stressed that the employee's responsibilities did not involve commercial activities such as contracting with foreign
doctors or providing overseas coverage; rather, his job was to process
health claims and collect premiums for Indonesia's national social security program. The court found that "such employment is by nature noncommercial."16 0 Nonetheless, the court cautioned that "mere employment
in the conduct of commercial activities" is not sufficient to satisfy the
exception because foreign sovereigns almost always act through their employees. 6 1 If mere employment were considered commercial activity,
62
"the exception would be expanded to swallow the rule."1

54. 538 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008).
55. Id. at 92 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992))
(emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. No. Civ. S-01-227, 2008 WL 295079 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2008).
58. Id. at *4.
59. No. 97-0084, 2008 WL 190364 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008).
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id. at *4 n.10.
62. Id.
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What Acts Cause a "Direct Effect" in the United States?

Once an act has been characterized as "commercial" under the FSIA, it
still must have a sufficient jurisdictional "nexus" with the United States to
fall within the commercial activity exception. This nexus can be shown in
three ways:
Acts in the U.S. by foreign states. The first clause of the exception
permits jurisdiction over acts carried on in the U.S. by foreign states.
This clause presents a fairly straightforward test for the geographic nexus,
and in 2008, the only significant question that arose under this clause was
whether a foreign state could be liable for the acts of its agents in the U.S.
The courts responded that, subject to traditional agency principles, if the
state implicitly or explicitly authorized the acts of its employees and
agents, such acts may be deemed "carried on" by the state, and subject to
review in U.S. courts. 6 3
Acts in the U.S. in connection with commercial activity abroad The
second clause of the commercial activity exception involves acts performed in the U.S. in connection with the a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere. Multiple cases in 2008 reaffirmed the well-established precedent that, for the exception to apply, the act in the U.S. must
be not only ''in connection with'' the commercial activity of the foreign
state, but also sufficient to form the basis of the suit itself. In other
words, if the foreign state's commercial acts in the U.S. are unrelated to
the cause of action, such acts cannot confer jurisdiction under the
exception. 6 4
Acts outside the U.S. that cause a "direct effect" in the U.S. The third
clause of the commercial activities exception grants U.S. court's jurisdiction over acts that occur outside the U.S. in connection with a foreign
state's commercial activity, but which cause a "direct effect" in the
United States. Because Congress provided no guidance as to what constitutes a "direct effect" in the United States, this clause tends to generate
substantial litigation. This remained true in 2008. Most litigation centers
on how strong the "direct effect" must be to bring an act within the exception. Here, too, courts have struggled to establish clearly-defined
boundaries, 65 but the decisions in 2008 provide some useful guidance
63. See Heroth v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 565 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2008); AngloIberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. Loderhose, No. 97-0084, 2008 WL 190364
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008).
64. See Heroth, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (finding defendant's actions of recruiting employees in U.S. insufficient to form basis of "failure to warn" cause of action); AngloIberia Underwriting Mgmr. Co., 2008 WL 190364 (finding defendant's support of
its employee in U.S. MBA program incidental to his employment, and therefore
insufficient to support jurisdiction over a claim for negligent supervision); Peterson
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding bank's
participation in bond offering on New York Stock Exchange insufficient to form
jurisdictional nexus to U.S. because terrorist acts that were basis of plaintiff's action occurred 24 years prior to stock offering at issue).
65. See Big Sky Network Canada, Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Gov't, 533 F.3d 1183, 1190
(10th Cir. 2008) ("We do not doubt that drawing lines between what qualifies as a
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looking forward.
Checks and Letters of Credit from U.S. Banks: Even where both parties to a commercial contract are foreign, they often choose to pay each
other through U.S. banks. This creates an attractive option for plaintiffs
seeking U.S. jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns because such financial
transactions arguably cause a "direct effect" in the United States, despite
the fact that all other relevant acts took place abroad. However, the
nexus between the financial transaction and the cause of action must be
strong-not merely incidental-to fall under this clause.
In Hilturas Miel, S. L. v. Republic of Iraq,6 6 the plaintiff sued Iraq under
a contract that required the sovereign to make payments pursuant to a
letter of credit issued by the New York branch of the Banque Nationale
de Paris. The District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that, since the contract required 1-ilturas to present certain documents
and collect the amounts due to it in the United States, the commercial
activity had a "direct effect" in the U.S. sufficient to confer jurisdiction
over the case.
By contrast, a New York state court found the jurisdictional nexus to
the U.S. insufficient where the Singapore branch of an international bank
(which also had U.S. offices) advised on a letter of credit between two
foreign parties. 6 7 The fact that the New York branch also was used "for
some tangential purpose" did not create a sufficient "direct effect" in the
United States for the New York court to exercise jurisdiction. The court
emphasized that "the United States was not identified as the place of
performance of any obligation under the letter of credit."168 Similarly, in
Agrocomplect, AD v. Republic of Iraq,6 9 the court declined to exercise
jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against Iraq because the contract at issue did not require that Iraq make payments through United States
banks. The fact that the parties entered into separate, related agreements
to finance the defendant's obligations using a U.S. bank did not change
this result. These financing obligations were not the actions that the
claim was "based upon," and therefore failed to create a "direct effect" in
the U.S. that would meet the jurisdictional nexus requirement of the commercial activity exception.
In Guirlando v. T.C. Ziraat IBankasi, A.S.,7 1 the federal court in the
Southern District of New York further required that the connection between the "effect" in the United States and the tortuous act be "legally
significant."17 1 In that case, a New York woman moved to Turkey and

66.
67.

68.
69.
70.
71.

direct, rather than an indirect, effect, like efforts to distinguish between proximate
and contributing causes, is a slippery business") (citations omitted).
573 F. Supp. 2d 781 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Lalasis Trading PTE, Led. v. Janawa Bank, 860 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Ist Dep't 2008).
Id. at 110-11.
247 F.R.D. 213 (D.D.C. 2008).
No. 07 Civ. 10266, 2008 WL 5272195 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008).
Id. at *4 n.4 (citing Filetech S.A. v. Fr. Telecom S.A., 157 F.3d 922, 931 (2d Cir.
1998), for the proposition that the Second Circuit's "legally significant acts" test
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transferred $250,000 of her life savings into an account at a Turkish staterun bank, at her husband's urging. When her husband turned out to be a
scam artist, she sued the Turkish national bank for failing to warn her that
he could withdraw her money from the account. The court found that it
lacked jurisdiction over her claim because her withdrawal of $250,000
from a New York bank account was not sufficient to establish a "direct
effect" in the U.S. Mere financial loss to an American individual or
firm-no matter how devastating-is not sufficient alone to trigger an exception to foreign sovereign immunity. The court noted that all "legally
significant acts" in connection with her claim -i.e., where she opened her
account, where the bank failed to warn her, and where her husband absconded with her money-occurred in Turkey. The court recognized the
harshness of the result, but maintained that it stayed appropriately within
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
Damage to a Parent Company-No Direct Effect: The Tenth Circuit
also adopted a narrow view of "direct effect" jurisdiction by holding that
a foreign company harmed abroad cannot gain jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign in the U.S. merely because the foreign company's parent is
American. In Big Sky Network Canada, Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Government,]2 a British Virgin Islands company with offices in Canada entered into a joint venture with the Chinese Government to provide cable
broadband services. When China reneged on the venture, the BVI company brought suit in the U.S., basing jurisdiction on the fact that its parent company-a Nevada corporation-suffered financially, lost profits and
was forced to reorganize as a result of China's breach. This, it argued,
caused a direct effect in the United States. The Tenth Circuit rejected
this argument, finding that the joint venture did not require any action in
the U.S., nor did the termination of the joint venture occur in the U.S.
Thus, while financial injuries ultimately were felt in the U.S. by plaintiff's
parent company, they were "derivative of a financial injury Big Sky suffered in China, and thus are not sufficiently direct under our case law to
invoke the commercial activity exception."17 3 In so holding, the court reinforced the general rule that mere financial loss to an American citizen
or company is "insufficient to place the direct effect of [a defendant's]
74

actions in the United States."1

Magnitude of Injury is Irrelevant to Direct Effect Inquiry: Both Guirlando and Big Sky also reaffirmed the proposition that the severity of the
injury to a U.S. party is irrelevant to the determination of whether the
effect is sufficiently "direct" to overcome the defendant's immunity. In
Big Sky, the plaintiff argued that the court should find a "direct effect"
because the defendant's acts financially harmed the U.S. parent company
requires that the "conduct having a direct effect in the United States be legally
significant conduct in order for the commercial activity exception to apply").
72. 533 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2008).
73. Id. at 1191.
74. Id. at 1190 (citing United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Prod. Ass'n, 33
F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 1994)).
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so badly that it was forced to restructure. The court recognized the severity of the parent company's injury, but added that § 1605(a)(2) does not
consider the "substantiality" of an effect - only whether it was direct, and
whether it was in the United States. In that case, the injury in question
was felt in China, and thus did not directly affect anyone in the U.S.,
regardless of how severely it was felt. Similarly, in Guirlando, the court
recognized the terrible plight of the defrauded bride, but held that "the
fact that Plaintiff suffered a substantial, or even devastating, financial loss
[by losing her life savings] does not permit the Court to exercisc jurisdic75
tion over a foreign state under the FSIA."1
C.

TAKINGS-§

1605(A)(3)

Though the "takings exception" is one of the lesser-used exceptions to
the FSIA, two cases in 2008 devoted significant discussion to its finer
points, and provide guidance for parties that may invoke it in the future.
The takings exception permits jurisdiction over a foreign state in any
case:
in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are
in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or that
property or any property exchanged for such property is owned or
operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and
that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in

the United States .7 6

Level of Commercial Activity Required The takings exception also
requires a commercial nexus to the United States. However, unlike the
nexus required by the commercial activity exception, the takings exception "does not require that the commercial activity be connected to the
actions resulting in the expropriation."17 7 Thus, under this exception, a
U.S. court may assert jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign carrying on
activities in the U.S. that are completely unrelated to the relevant cause
of action. For example, in the 2008 decision Agudas Chasidei Chabad of
United States v. Russian Federation, the plaintiffs were able to invoke the
takings exception in a claim to recover a religious archive that was allegedly "taken" nearly a century ago, based on the defendant Russian agen-

cies' unrelated, present-day publishing contracts in the

U.S.

71

This seemingly low jurisdictional threshold has its boundaries, however, which were addressed by the New York federal district court in
Freund v. Republic of France.7 9 In Freund, a group of Holocaust survivors and their families sued France and a French government-run bank
75. 2008 WL 5272195, at *4 n.*5.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
77. Freund v. Republic of France, 592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
78. 528 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
79. 592 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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and railroad company for unlawfully confiscating their money and property during World War 11. Because the property was not in the United
States, plaintiffs asserted the second jurisdictional nexus clause of the takings exception-i.e., that the property was "owned or operated by an
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States."180
Plaintiffs argued that both the bank and the railroad were engaged in
commercial activity in the U.S. through the actions of their subsidiaries,
which included advertising on U.S. websites and construction projects in
the U.S. The district court rejected this argument, finding that actions by
distant subsidiaries are insufficient to capture foreign entities within the
takings exception. The defendant agencies in Freund were removed from
their subsidiaries (which were engaged in commercial activity in the U.S.)
by multiple organizational layers. The court explained that to meet the
jurisdictional nexus requirement under the FSIA takings exception there
must be "at least, an affirmative decision by the agency or instrumentality
to perform a commercial transaction or act" in the U.S. 8' Because the
foreign agencies did not exercise control over these subsidiaries, they
could not be held accountable for their acts in the United States. Thus,
the plaintiffs could not use these subsidiaries' acts to create a jurisdictional nexus with the U.S. sufficient to subject the foreign agencies to
U.S. courts' jurisdiction.
Property "Owned and Operated" by a Foreign Entity. The absence of
an adequate commercial nexus was not the only problem for plaintiffs in
Freund. In fact, with respect to one of the defendants, plaintiffs were able
to prove that it was engaged in commercial activity in the U.S. but were
unable to prove the second required element-i.e., that their allegedly expropriated property had been "exchanged for" property that the defendant now "owned or operated." The court applied the FSIA's burdenshifting analysis, and found that since the defendant had made a prima
facie case for immunity by showing that it was an instrumentality of a
foreign state, the burden was on the plaintiff to show why the takings
exception should apply. Plaintiffs submitted voluminous reports to the
court, but none of them were sufficient to show that the defendant's current assets could be traced to the property that was once taken from
plaintiffs. Thus, in the absence of any evidence that the subject property
was in the defendants' possession, plaintiffs' claims could not stand.
D.

NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS-§

1605(A)(5)

The "non-commercial tort" or "tortuous activity" exception deprives a
sovereign defendant of immunity in any case in "which money damages
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death or damages
or loss of property occurring in the United States and caused by the tortuous act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
81. Freund, 592 F. Supp.2d at 556.
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that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment."18 2 However, the exception does not apply where the claim is based
on the exercise or performance of (or failure to exercise or perform) a
"discretionary function."18 3 The exception also does not apply to claims
arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, mis-

representation, deceit or interference with contractual rights. 8 4

Courts have noted that Congress's primary purpose in enacting the tortuous activity exception was "to eliminate a foreign state's immunity for
traffic accidents and other torts committed in the United States, for which
liability is imposed under domestic tort law."185 Recent cases demonstrate, however, that plaintiffs are seeking to use the exception to cover
claims far beyond the typical diplomatic traffic incident.
In O'Bryan v. Holy See, the Sixth Circuit addressed whether the tortuous activity exception applied to claims against the Holy See by the al-

leged victims of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic priests. 8 6 The appellate
court dismissed certain claims arising under a negligent supervision theory as a discretionary function and also dismissed those claims which
were based on actions occurring outside the United States. The court
also dismissed plaintiff's misrepresentation and deceit claims as those
claims expressly fell outside the exception. Nonetheless, the court held
that it had jurisdiction over plaintiff's tort claims stemming from the alleged tortuous activities by certain bishops and high-level authorities in
the United States. The court found that these authorities were agents or
employees of the Holy See and, thus, their activities could be attributed
to the sovereign state. Further, the court held that plaintiff's claims, including failure to report and failure to warn negligence claims, did not fall
under the discretionary function exception because the Holy See's 1962
policy allegedly directed its employees to impose the "highest level of
secrecy on the handling of clergy and sexual abuse matters."187 Thus, the
court denied the Holy See's motion to dismiss, allowing this high-profile
case to go forward against the Holy See.
The events of September 11, 2001 also have required courts to address
the novel question of whether any overlap exists between the terrorism
exception and the non-commercial tort exception in cases arising from a
terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11,
2001, the Second Circuit dismissed claims by victims of the September 11,
2001 attacks against the Saudi Arabian Government under the FSIA's
tort exception on the ground that the terrorism exception provided the
82. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5).

83. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B).
85. O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989), and H.R. Rep. No. 941487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6623, at 14).
86. 549 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2008), amended and superseded on other grounds~by 556
F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2009).
87. Id. at 457.
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exclusive basis for any "claims based on terrorism."18 8 In Doe v. Bin
Laden, however, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia allowed plaintiffs to take jurisdictional discovery in connection
with terrorism -related claims under the tortuous activity exception. 8 9 In
that case, victims of the September 11 attacks brought claims against the
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, alleging a civil conspiracy with
the Taliban and the Republic of Iraq to carry out the September 11, 2001,
attacks. While the court did not directly address an argument that the
terrorism exception was the exclusive basis for terrorism-related claims,
the court held that the tort exception did not preclude plaintiff's civil conspiracy claims. The court allowed the plaintiff to take jurisdictional discovery to explore the connection between the Taliban and Afghanistan,
as well as the question whether Afghanistan had participated in the conspiracy to engage in terrorist activities leading to the September 11th
attacks. 90

E.

ARBITRATION-§

1 6 05 (A)(6)

United States courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA to enforce an
agreement to arbitrate or to confirm an award made pursuant to such an
agreement in two cases: (1) where the arbitration took place or is intended to take place in the United States; or (2) where the agreement or
award is governed by a treaty or other international agreement calling for
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 9 1
In 2008, the D.C. Circuit recognized the limitations of this exception-including how a contractual agreement vesting jurisdiction in another country's courts can trump the arbitration exception. The court in
Agrocomplect AD v. Republic of Iraq92 held that it did not have jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim against Iraq under the arbitration
exception of the FSIA because the contract at issue, while providing for
arbitration, also vested exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out of
the contract in Iraqi courts. In addition, Iraq was not a signatory to any
international agreement calling for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards. As such, Iraq was not subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
In Suraleb, Inc. v. Production Ass'n "Minsk Tractor Works, " Republic
of Belarus, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois upheld
the plaintiff's right to execute on an arbitral award by attaching property
belonging to a company wholly owned by Belarus. 9 3 The court ultimately
denied Suraleb's request for a writ of execution, however, because
Suraleb had not specifically identified the property within the court's district that it sought to attach. 94
88. 538 F.3d at 90.
89. 580 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C. 2008).
90. Id. at 97-98.

91.
92.
93.
94.

28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6).
247 F.R.D. 213 (D.C. cir. 2008).
No. 06-C3496, 2008 WL 294839, at *2 (N.D. 111.
Jan. 31, 2008).
Id.
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F. TERRORISM-§ 1605(A)(7), 1605A, AND OTHER CLAIMS
Cases under the "Terrorism Exception" to the FSIA continued to dominate the FSIA landscape in 2008.95 Enacted in 1996, the Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act-codified as Section 1605(a)(7) of the
FSIA-was designed to "'give American citizens an important economic
weapon against . . . outlaw states that sponsor terrorism by providing 'safe

havens, funding, training, supplying weaponry, medical assistance, false
travel documentation, and the like."' 9 6 Such an exception had been
sought by victims' groups for a long time but had met resistance from the
Executive Branch out of fear that it "might cause other nations to respond in kind, thus potentially subjecting the American government to
suits in foreign countries for actions taken in the United States." 97
Ultimately, Congress settled on a compromise approach which permitted U.S. nationals to sue foreign states (and their agencies and instrumentalities) for terrorist acts in limited circumstances, the most notable being
that the plaintiffs must be U.S. nationals, and the defendant must be designated by the United States Government as a "state sponsor of terror95. More than thirty percent of the 2008 decisions mentioning the FSIA discuss terrorism or the "terrorism exception." See (alphabetically) Acosta v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540
F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Doe v. Bin Laden, 580 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C.
2008) (Osama Bin Laden); Fisher v. Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya,541 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008) (Libya); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (Syria); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
545 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 545
F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); In Re Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001, 538 F.3d 71 (2d. Cir. 2008); Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F.
Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); La Reunion Aerienne v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,533 F.3d 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Libya); Lawton v. Republic of
Iraq, 581 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iraq); Massie v. Government of Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 592 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2008) (North Korea); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Pugh
v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,530 F. Supp. 2d 216 (D.D.C. 2008)
(Libya); Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 575 F. Supp. 2d 181 (D.D.C. 2008)
(Iran); Saludes v. Republica de Cuba, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (Cuba);
Steen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 00-3037, 2008 WL 1800778 (D.D.C. Apr. 21,
2008) (Iran); Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C.
2008) (Iran); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 545 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C. 2008)
(Iran); Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 266 Fed. Appx. 1, 2008 WL 441828
(D.C.Cir. Jan. 25, 2008) (Syria); Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (Sudan); Bakhtiar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 571 F. Supp. 2d 27
(D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
cert. granted,129 S. Ct. 894 (2009) (Iraq); Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F.
Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp.
2d 143 (D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Stethem v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Prevatt v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp. 2d 144
(D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp. 2d 146
(D.D.C. 2008) (Iran); Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,529 F.
Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2008) (Libya).
96. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d at 88 (quoting H.R.Rep.
No. 104-383, at 62 (1995)).
97. Id. (quoting Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89
(D.C. Cir. 2002)).

200

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

ism" either at the time of the terrorist act, or at some later time as a result
of the act which is the subject of the suit. 9 8 Over the past decade, scores
of cases have resulted in substantial damages awards against Libya, Iran,
Syria, Cuba and Sudan for terrorist acts committed by these states or
committed by others but sponsored by these states. In 2008, for the first
time, a terrorist case also went to judgment against North Korea. 9 9
Resolution of Libyan Claims. Of particular note in 2008 was the determination by the Executive Branch to espouse' 0 0 all pending terrorismrelated claims against Libya as part of a comprehensive settlement with
the African nation to settle outstanding litigation and pave the way for
renewed economic ties with the U.S. The determination followed a January 2008 decision by a District of Columbia federal district court awarding the families and estates of seven American citizens $6 billion in
damages against the Libyan government and six Libyan officials for their
involvement in the bombing of a French airliner in 1989.101 The judgment was the first ever terrorism judgment in a contested litigation with a
foreign state. Faced with the possibility of having its assets in the United
States attached for purposes of satisfying this enormous judgment, Libya
entered into negotiations with the United States to resolve all outstanding claims in exchange for a full release.' 0 2 In October 2008, Libya deposited $1.5 billion into an account for the payment of claims to victims
of Libyan terrorist acts in exchange for its renewed immunity from suit
for claims brought under the Terrorist Exception.
Practical Challenges under § 1605 (a) (7) . In practice, litigants have
faced hurdles in successfully adjudicating their terrorism-related claims
against foreign states.10 3 First, until recent legislative changes, the statute
98. Currently, that list consists of Cuba, Iran, Syria and Sudan. Countries that were
once on the list but have since been removed include Iraq, Afghanistan, North
Korea, South Yemen and Libya.
99. Massie v. Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 592 F. Supp.
2d 57 (D.D.C. 2008).
100. Espousal refers to an act by the President, consistent with his constitutional authority in the realm of foreign relations, to compromise or settle the claims of U.S.
nationals against a foreign sovereign. The practice goes back over 200 years and
has received congressional acquiescence throughout its history, leading the Supreme Court to conclude: "[tlhat the President's control of foreign relations includes the settlement of claims is indisputable." See American Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003).
101. Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 530 F. Supp. 2d 216 (2008).
102. Libya was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2006, but this did
not retroactively affect outstanding cases brought during the time of Libya's
designation.
103. Perhaps recognizing these hurdles, or maybe simply as a result of the horrific nature of the claims themselves, courts also have shown patience (and, in some circumstances, leniency) in allowing plaintiffs to assert a proper claim under the
Terrorism Exception. That trend continued in 2008 as courts identified deficiencies in plaintiffs' claims but provided guidance to the plaintiffs on how to remedy
them in lieu of dismissal. See, e.g., Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan
Jamahiriya. 529 F. Supp. 2d 80 (D.D.C. 2008); Wachsman v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2008); Ben-Rafael v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 540
F. Supp. 2d 39, 58 (D.D.C. 2008) (allowing infant children to state claims for "emotional distress" and permitting wrongful death claim to proceed under D.C. law
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did not provide a cause of action against foreign states, but only waived
immunity for terrorism-related claims. Many cases were delayed, or in
some cases, limited in scope, as the plaintiffs were required to prove an
entitlement to relief under applicable-but often inconsistent-state
laws.'10 4 Plaintiffs also have experienced difficulties enforcing their judgments against foreign states-most often obtained by default-because of
the strict standards for reaching foreign sovereign assets even with a finding of liability.
The Lautenberg Amendments to the Terrorism Exception. To address
certain of these challenges, on January 28, 2008, the President signed into
law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
("NDAA").10 5 Section 1083 of the NDAA replaced Section 1605(a)(7)
with a new "terrorism exception"-codified as Section 1605A-with certain
significant plaintiff-friendly modifications. Among the most significant,
the new statute (a) expressly provided plaintiffs with a federal cause of
action against state sponsors of terrorism; and (b) allowed plaintiffs to
seek punitive damages.' 06 Congress also permitted plaintiffs with "pending cases" to invoke the new statute, provided they "re-filed" their suit
07
based on Section 1605A within sixty days of its passage.'1
One recurring question the courts faced in 2008 was how this new statute affected cases brought under the now-stricken prior terrorism exception to the FSIA, but in which the plaintiffs did not avail themselves of
the limited opportunity to recast their claims under the NDAA. In several such cases, the sovereign defendants argued that the courts no longer

104.

105.
106.

107.

though a "literal reading" of the statute "may arguably bar recovery for injuries
occurring outside the District").
Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic. 580 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Bakhtiar
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 571 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding certain family members unable to state claim under California law either because of attenuated family relationships or because of an inability to demonstrate actual
emotional distress).
Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3.
See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008) ($150,000,000
in punitive damages); Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15
(D.D.C. 2008) ($300,000,000 in punitive damages-or "three times defendant Iran's
annual expenditure on terrorism").
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. In several 2008 cases, courts refused to allow plaintiffs who
previously had obtained default judgments against state sponsors of terrorism,
without appeal, to avail themselves of the post-judgment benefits of the new statute because their cases were not "pending" at the time of the NDAA's passage.
See Bodoff v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.D.C. 2008); Blais v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D.D.C. 2008); Prevatt v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 567 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2008); Stethem v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Haim v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 567 F.
Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008); Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. C08-80030MISC, 2008 WL 5046327 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008); Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2008); Beer v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
574 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2008); Welch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 545 F. Supp. 2d
118 (D.D.C. 2008); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 545 F. Supp. 2d 122
(D.D.C. 2008); Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 545 F. Supp. 2d 120 (D.D.C.
2008); Steen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 00-3037, 2008 WL 1800778 (D.D.C.
Apr. 21, 2008).
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retained jurisdiction over those cases because the alleged statutory basis
for immunity no longer applied.' 08 The D.C. Circuit resolved this question in Simon v. Republic of Iraq,'0 9 holding that the courts "retained
jurisdiction over cases pending pursuant to former § 1605(a)(7) when the
Congress enacted the NDAA.""10 However, plaintiffs who failed to
amend their complaints to state a claim under the NDAA have not been
permitted to avail themselves of the benefits of the new statute." 1 '
Constitutional Challenge. In 2008, the D.C. Circuit also addressed a
constitutional challenge to the FSIA Terrorism Exception. In Owens v.
Republic of Sudan,' 12 Sudan argued that the exception constituted an unconstitutional delegation of power to the Executive Branch because it authorized the Secretary of State to determine the jurisdiction of the federal
courts by designating state sponsors of terrorism subject to suit in the
United States. The D.C. Circuit rejected Sudan's argument, finding that
Congress did not empower the Executive Branch to define the jurisdiction of the courts, but rather only determined that jurisdiction should
rest, in part, on a "factual finding" by the Executive Branch, which it
already was authorized to make pursuant to prior legislation."13 The
court found this especially appropriate given the unique constitutional
powers reserved for the Executive Branch in foreign affairs. The court
also pointed out that this deference to Executive fact-finding is not
unique to the Terrorism Exception-the entire FSIA "depends upon the
President's decision to recognize an entity as a foreign nation because the
4
FSIA only applies to recognized nations.""
Third-party claims. Finally, the D.C. Circuit ruled in La Rtjunion A&rienne v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya'1 5 that the Terrorism
Exception provides jurisdiction not only for direct claims by victims of
terrorism against their aggressors, but also for third parties to whom the
victims have assigned such claims, e.g., to recover insurance payments.
Libya argued that once the claims are assigned, they no longer are for
money damages "for personal injury or death" under the FSIA, but
rather for money damages for payments made to the victims themselves
under commercial insurance contracts. The D.C. Circuit disagreed, holding that the payments made to the victims were specifically for money
108. See, e.g., Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
109. 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009).
110. Courts uniformly have held that Section 1605(a)(7) continues to apply to actions
brought prior to the effective date of the NDAA. See Saludes v. Republica de
Cuba, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1251 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Bakhtiar v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 571 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008).
111. See, e.g., Bakhtiar, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 38; Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187
(D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009); but see Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15 (D.D.C. 2008) (U.S. family members of assassinated Israeli citizen awarded $300 million in punitive damages against Iran after
amending their complaint to state a claim under § 1605A).
112. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
113. Id. at 889.
114. Id. at 892.
115. 533 F.3d 837 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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damages "for the deaths of the victims" and, therefore, the third-party
insurers simply stepped into the shoes of the victims for purposes of a
claim under the Terrorism Exception. The court also emphasized the language in the statute which allows claims when either the victim or the
" claimant" is a U.S. national. Since the victims were U.S. nationals, the
claims were valid and sustainable.
Other claims. Several 2008 cases involved claims for alleged "extrajudicial killings" or other terrorist acts against defendants not subject to the
Terrorism Exception because they were not designated "state sponsors of
terrorism" by the United States Government. Plaintiffs in these cases
tried a variety of mechanisms to avoid the limitations of the FSIA, with
mixed results.
In Beihas v. Ya'A Ion," 6 plaintiffs sought damages against a retired general of the Israeli Defense Forces resulting from injuries and death suffered during a battle between Israeli and I-ezbollah forces in 1996.
Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Torture Victims Protection Act, 17 and
the Alien Tort Claims Act, and also argued that the defendant should be
liable for violations of ]us cogens norms of international law. The court
dismissed the claims, finding that none of the referenced causes of action
18
abrogated the defendant's immunity under the FSIA.'
Plaintiffs also sought to bring terrorism-related claims against foreign
sovereigns under the federal Anti-Terrorism Act ("ATA")."19 In one
2008 case, 12 0 the court refused to allow claims against Iraq to go forward
under the Act, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the Terrorism Exception should be applied retroactively to allow the previously enacted
ATA to be used against foreign states.'12 ' However, in Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Organization'12 2 the plaintiffs were permitted to proceed
with ATA claims against the Palestine Liberation Organization and the
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority because neither the PLO
or the PA met the definition of "state" under United States or international law. Therefore, neither was entitled to immunity under the FSIA.
Finally, in a decision with potentially significant ramifications for future
sovereign litigation, the Second Circuit refused to allow victims of the
September 11, 2001 attacks to bring claims against the Saudi Arabian
Government under the FSIA's tort exception because the Terrorism Exception provided the exclusive basis for any "claims based on terror116. 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1350, note.
118. The court specifically referenced the Terrorism Exception to demonstrate that
Congress knows how to create exceptions to sovereign immunity in specific cases,
including those involving terrorism, but chose not to do so in connection with the
TVPA or ATCA. Id. at 1289.
119. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 et seq. (2000).
120. Lawton v. Republic of Iraq, 581 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2008).
121. Since Iraq was subject to jurisdiction under the Terrorism Exception, the court
addressed only whether plaintiffs could state a substantive claim against the sovereign under the ATA.
122. 583 F. Supp. 2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
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iSM."'12 3

The court reasoned that plaintiffs should not be permitted to

"shoehorn a claim properly brought under one exception into another."'12 4 One problem posed by the Second Circuit's analysis is that
claims against Saudi Arabia could not "properly be brought" under any
other exception to the FSIA because Saudi Arabia is not on the list of
"4state sponsors of terrorism." Moreover, the terrorism exception specifically addresses terrorism claims based on acts occurring outside the
United States, while the tort exception covers domestic torts. It will be
interesting to see whether future courts adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning or recognize the different purposes and scopes of the FSIA's various exceptions when deciding whether to allow claims against sovereign
entities to proceed.
IV.

ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDS AGAINST
FOREIGN STATES

Property in the United States of a foreign state (including an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state) generally is immune from attachment
under the FSIA, 12 5 unless the property fits into an exception under
§ 1610(a) or (b) and a reasonable time has passed from the time judgment is entered.' 2 6 Thus, the FSIA permits post-judgment attachment of
a foreign state's property located in the United States, if the property is
used for a commercial activity in the United States and the property
meets one of several exceptions to attachment immunity listed in
§1610. 127 The standard for attaching the property of an agency or instrumentality is more relaxed. Property of an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state is subject to attachment where that agency or instrumentality is "engaged in commercial activity in the United States," irrespective
of whether the property itself was used for commercial activity within the
U.S.

28
1

This exception to attachment immunity applies where the agency

or instrumentality has waived its immunity from attachment (either explicitly or implicitly), or in cases where the judgment relates to certain
claims where the agency or instrumentality's jurisdictional immunity is
waived automatically, such as those arising under certain of the § 1605

exceptions to immunity.'12 9
123. 538 F.3d at 90.
124. Id. at 89.

125. For examples of property that always is immune from attachment, e.g., property of
foreign central banks, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1611(a) and (b).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c).
127. Examples of these exceptions include claims where the foreign state has waived its
immunity, the property was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim
is based, the execution relates to a judgment based on expropriation of property,
the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award, or the judgment
relates to a claim under the terrorism exception. For a complete list, see 28 U.s.c.
§§ 1610(a)(1)-(7).
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b).
129. Reflecting Congress's intention to facilitate the enforcement of terrorism judgments, the FSIA also includes special provisions regarding enforcement of judg-
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A series of cases in 2008 helps to demonstrate the current state of the
law on attachment and execution under the FSIA, addressing these and
other related issues, including waiver of immunity from pre-judgment attachment, attachment of third-party property, attachment of property of
an agency or instrumentality, and damages for wrongful attachment.
Discovery in Aid of Attachment. In the latest chapter of a long-standing case against Iran, plaintiff Jenny Rubin sought discovery and attachment pursuant to the "blocked" assets provision of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act ("TRIA") of Persian antiquities allegedly owned by the
Islamic Republic of Iran but held by the University of Chicago.' 3 0 The
Northern District of Illinois district court found that although the FSIA
and TRIA are silent with respect to discovery requests, they do not preclude discovery in aid of attachment. Rather, the court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence define the scope of discoverable evidence (i.e.,
information that is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence),
while the FSIA and TRIA simply define the subset of Iran's assets subject to attachment or execution. 13 1
Waiver of Pre-Judgment Attachment Imm unity. To the extent that
pre-judgment security for claims against a sovereign is treated as a form
of "attachment," immunity from pre-judgment attachment may be
3 2 In Shipping Corp.
waived only by "unmistakable and plain language."'1
of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi, the court found that neither susceptibility to counterclaims under § 1607 nor attachment of the defendant's funds
amounted to an "unmistakable" or "clear and unambiguous" waiver of
the plaintiff's immunity to pre-judgment attachment. Thus, the court denied the defendant's motion for counter-security.' 3 3
Attachment of Third-Party Property. Property held by third parties in
which a sovereign holds an interest generally is subject to attachment in
satisfaction of judgment. But in Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the
court quashed the plaintiffs' post-judgment writs of attachment on the
assets of third-party garnishees on the basis of sovereign immunity.' 3 4
The plaintiff had obtained judgment against the Government of Iran for
the bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon and sought to satisfy the
judgment by attaching the property of two Japanese national banks and
one Korean national bank. The court held that the assets of the banks
were protected by sovereign immunity even though plaintiff sought to

130.

131.
132.
133.
134.

ments in terrorism cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act).
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2008 WL 2501996 (N.D. Ill.
May 23, 2008), modified on reconsideration, 2008 WL 2502039 (N.D. 111.June 23,
2008); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 541 F. Supp. 2d 416 (D. Mass. 2008);
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03 CV 9370, 2008 WL 192321 (N.D. 111.Jan.
18, 2008).
Rubin, 2008 WL 192321.
No. 08 Civ. 4328, 2008 WL 2596229, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2008) (emphasis
added).
Id. at *2.
563 F. Supp. 2d 268 (D.D.C. 2008).
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levy upon oniy the assets of Iran held by the bank and not the assets of
the national banks themselves. The court also found that sovereign immunity protected the banks from jurisdiction and, thus, was a complete
bar to attachment of assets in their possession. Thus, the court also denied plaintiffs' motion to appoint a receiver because it would allow the
35
plaintiffs "to do indirectly what they cannot do directly."'
Attaching Assets of an Agency or Instrumentality. Where a foreign
state has waived immunity or otherwise is properly subject to jurisdiction,
a judgment creditor may attach and execute against the foreign state's
property under §§ 1610(a) and (d) of the FSIA. In addition, courts have
relied on the seminal case of First National City Bank v. Banco Para El
Comercic Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec")136 to determine whether to permit attachment of the property of an agency or instrumentality of the
state to satisfy a judgment against the state itself. The "Bancec" analysis
is similar to the traditional "veil-piercing" analysis under U.S. law in that
it applies a strong presumption of independence and requires a finding
that the agency or instrumentality is an alter-ego of the sovereign or that
that the sovereign exercises day-to-day control over the entity.
Some courts similarly apply a "core functions" analysis to determine
whether to treat an agency or instrumentality as if it were the state itself
for purposes of attachment. In Aurelius Capital Partners, LP v. Republic
of Argentina,'3 7 the plaintiffs argued that Argentina had waived immunity from attachment, thereby enabling them to pursue assets held by Administracion Nacional de Seguridad Social (ANSES)-an agency or
instrumentality of the Republic. The court agreed. Because the Republic
of Argentina dominated the finances of ANSES and used ANSES to obtain funds for non-pension uses by the Government, the court found that
ANSES' predominant or "core"~ function was governmental and not commercial. 13 8 Therefore, ANSES was treated like the Argentine state itself
and its assets were subject to attachment and execution to the same degree as assets of the Republic of Argentina itself.
Potential Risks in Attaching Foreign Sovereign Assets. Attachment of
foreign sovereign assets under the ESIA is not without significant risk. In
one case decided by the Southern District of New York, ETI v. Republic
of Bolivia,'3 9 the court awarded the defendant, Empresa Nacional de
Telecommunicaciones Entel S.A., nearly $1.4 million in damages for
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983).
No. 07 Civ. 2715, 2008 WL 5203732 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2008).
The court found unavailing defendants argument that ANSES's assets were protected under the Bancec strong presumption of independent status. Instead, the
court found on the basis of Second Circuit precedent (i.e.. Garb v. Republic of
Poland, 440 F.3d 579 (2d Cir 2006)), that the relaxed agency or instrumentality
standard for attachment was intended to target "public commercial enterprises,"
and that this was tested by using the "core function" analysis to determine whether
the core functions of the entity are predominantly governmental or commercial.
139. E. TLI Euro Telecom Int'l N.V. v. Republic of Bolivia, No. 08 Civ. 4247(LTS)(FM),
2008 WL 5170168, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2008).
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wrongful attachment. Under New York's Civil Practice Law & Rules
6212, "attaching plaintiffs [are] strictly liable for all damages occasioned
by the wrongful attachment" where such wrongful attachment is the
proximate cause of the damage. Attorneys' fees and costs were included

in the award.'140
V.

PRACTICAL ISSUES IN FSIA LITIGATION

The majority of cases under the FSLA involve the exceptions to immunity discussed above. In addition, 2008 FSIA opinions provide some useful guidance regarding some of the practical issues that arise in cases
brought against foreign sovereigns. A brief review of these issues and
decisions follows.
A.

SERVICE OF PROCESS

Service under the FSIA is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a) and (b).
Those provisions set forth various acceptable methods of service, depending on whether the party being served is (a) a foreign state or political
subdivision; or (b) an agency or instrumentality. Though the statute sets
forth seemingly straightforward instructions for serving foreign sovereigns, parties in 2008 continued to test new methods of service to reach
their foreign adversaries-methods that were generally met with disapproval by the courts.
One clear trend in 2008 was the courts' strict adherence to the sequential requirements of service under the FSIA. For example, Section
1608(a) requires a plaintiff to serve a foreign state using the designated
methods of service set forth in the statute, in order-i.e., using the next
method only if all preceding methods are not available-as follows: (1) in
accordance with a special arrangement between the plaintiff and the foreign state; (2) in accordance with an applicable international convention
on service; (3) by mail, return receipt required, from the clerk of the
court to the foreign state's ministry of foreign affairs; or (4) by diplomatic
channels through the State Department in Washington, D.C. Multiple
courts in 2008 emphasized that, because Congress expressly created a sequential method of service, any deviance from this strict sequential order
without proper basis is facially invalid. 41 1 Sequential requirements also
140. In the same suit, the court denied the Republic of Bolivia's motion for award of
costs and damages against ETI. Bolivia claimed it was entitled to damages under
the New York statute because it was a successful defendant inl the suit. But the
plaintiff had failed to successfully attach Bolivia's assets. Further, although Bolivia
claimed 97.5% ownership of Entel-sufficient to cloak it in immunity as an agency
or instrumentality of Bolivia-it claimed no ownership in Entel's assets that were
actually attached. T1hus, the court rejected Bolivia's expansive reading of the statute that any successful defendant in the action could claim wrongful attachment
damages, and limited recovery under NY CPLR 6212(e) solely to actual owners of
the property that actually was attached.
141. See, e.g. Hilaturas Miel, S.L. v. Republic of Iraq, 573 F. Supp. 2d 781, 796,
with § 1608 be(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff failed to strictly comply
4
cause it attempted service by diplomatic means under § 1608(a)( ) when service by
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exist for service on agencies and instrumentalities under Section 1608(b).
Parties seeking to effect service also must be mindful of the local law in
the jurisdiction where process is to be served. For example, in Rice Corp.
v. Grain Board of Iraq,142 the plaintiff was unable to serve an instrumentality of Iraq under §§ 1608(b)(1) or (2), because no special arrangement
or international agreement at the time provided for the proper service of
papers on that particular defendant. Thus, the plaintiff was required to
serve the defendant under § 1608(b)(3)(C), i.e., "consistent with the law
of the place where service is to be made." The plaintiff-seeking to ease
the burdens of serving hard-to-reach defendants-served the defendant by
e-mail, arguing that "there is no evidence stating that service by ... email
is 'Prohibited' by Iraqi law.""' 3 The court rejected this argument and
found that, in the absence of affirmative evidence showing that service by
e-mail was acceptable under Iraqi law, such service was invalid.
Finally, in a case highlighting the continuing interplay of the Executive
and Judicial Branches in FSIA matters-even in the post-Tate Letter statutory scheme-a District of Columbia federal district court held that plaintiff's service on a Chinese cabinet official while he was on a diplomatic
trip to Washington, D.C. was invalid.'14 4 The court did not base this decision on any statutory ground. Instead, the court wrote a letter to the
State Department seeking the Executive Branch's guidance on whether
the court should exercise jurisdiction and hear the case. The State Department submitted a Suggestion of Immunity and Statement of Interest
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, asking the court to find that, as a member of
a special diplomatic mission, the Chinese official should be immune from
service and therefore not subject to the court's jurisdiction.14 5 The court
agreed, deferring to the Executive Branch and holding further that "a
suggestion of immunity by the Executive Branch on behalf of a head of
state or diplomatic agent is binding upon the federal courts and must be
accepted as conclusive."'14 6

B.

DUE PROCESS AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION

TeFSIA confers not only subject matter jurisdiction over certain
claims against foreign sovereigns, but personal jurisdiction as well. As a

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Federal Express was available and would have complied with § 1608(a)(3)); see
also Sachs v. Republic of Austria, No. C 08 1840, 2008 WL 1815810 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
12, 2008) (finding that, before it would permit plaintiff to serve foreign agent or
instrumentality under § 1608(b)(3), plaintiff would have to convince the court that
service under § 1608(b)(1) and (2) was impossible).
582 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
Id. at 1312.
Weixuni v. Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37 (citing Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625-26 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also First
Am. Corp., 948 F. Supp. at 1119 (citing Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578,
589 (1943)); Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614. 617 (5th Cir. 1974); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Abdulaziz v. Metro. Dade County, 741
F.2d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984); Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir.
1949).
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general rule, the FSIA provides that personal jurisdiction over foreign
sovereigns exists where subject matter jurisdiction has been established
and service of process has been accomplished pursuant to 28 U.s.c.
§ 1608. 147 Some sovereign defendants have argued, however, that courts
also must consider the traditional constitutional due process requirements-i.e., that there must be "sufficient minimum contacts between the
foreign state and the forum such that maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'14 8 In other
words, these sovereigns have argued that foreign states must be afforded
the same constitutional protection as individuals under the due process
clause of the United States Constitution.
In 2008, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed its longstanding position that,
under the FSIA, foreign states are not entitled to any such constitutional
due process rights because "foreign states are not 'persons' protected by
the Fifth Amendment."14 9 In doing so, the court quoted its prior decision
in Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, where it set forth
several grounds for its conclusion that foreign states are not persons with
due process rights, including, inter alia, that the Supreme Court had ruled
that the U.S. states are not "persons" for purposes of the due process
clause, and foreign states therefore were entitled to no greater deference.'15 0 Nationwide, most federal courts that have subsequently consid51
ered this question have followed the ruling in Price.1
Still, the D.C. Circuit's view has not been universally accepted. In
2008, the Second Circuit continued to follow its own pre-Priceprecedent
that personal jurisdiction under the FSIA must comport with the due process clause. Thus, in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, the
court declined to reach the broader question of whether foreign states
have due process rights, but nevertheless required that there be sufficient
minimum contacts with the foreign sovereign to support jurisdiction

under the FSIA.

52
1

C.

INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS

Special rules apply to appeals in litigation involving foreign sovereigns.
Federal appellate courts ordinarily do not entertain appeals from deci147. Kirschenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 572 F. Supp. 2d 200 (D.D.C. 2008).
148. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
149. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 266 Fed. Appx. 1, 2008 WL 441828 (D.C.Cir. Jan.
25, 2008) (quoting Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82,
96 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
150. Price, 294 F.3d at 96.
151. See Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Rux
v. Republic of Sudan, No. Civ. A. 2:04CV428, 2005 WL 2086202, at *18 (E.D. Va.
Aug. 26, 2005); Cruz v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2005);
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2001);
U'Bryan v. Holy See, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784, 794 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
152. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 85 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008)
(citing Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991)).

210

LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 16

sions that do not conclusively end the litigation ("interlocutory appeals").
This includes, e.g., appeals of orders denying a motion to dismiss. Yet
courts have held that when such an order subjects a foreign sovereign to
jurisdiction, it is appealable under the "collateral order doctrine" because
"4sovereign immunity is an immunity from trial and the attendant burdens
of litigation, and not just a defense to liability on the merits." 15 3 In other
words, the courts recognize that to prohibit a foreign sovereign from appealing the denial of its motion to dismiss would thwart the purpose of
sovereign immunity, which is to protect sovereigns from the burdens of
trial and pre-trial proceedings.
D.

JURISDicTrIONAL DISCOVERY

Because sovereign immunity is designed to protect sovereign governments not only from judgments of foreign courts but also the "burdens of
litigation," U.S. courts generally are wary of subjecting foreign sovereigns
to jurisdictional discovery absent a compelling showing by the plaintiff.
This issue traditionally arises when a plaintiff seeks to prove that a foreign sovereign falls within one of the exceptions of the FSIA, but requires
additional evidence to make such a showing-evidence that may be obtained only through jurisdictional discovery.
In 2008, courts continued to recognize that "a tension exists between
permitting discovery to substantiate exceptions to statutory foreign sovereign immunity and protecting a sovereign's. ...legitimate claim to immunity from discovery."' 5 4 In Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the D.C.
District Court, quoting an earlier D.C. Circuit opinion, stated:
jurisdictional discovery should not be ordered when to do so would
frustrate the significance and benefit of entitlement to immunity
from suit. . . . Rather, jurisdictional discovery should be permitted
only if it is possible that the plaintiff could demonstrate the requisite
jurisdictional facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction and
it should not be allowed when discovery would be futile.' 55
In short, unless a plaintiff alleges specific facts that could make jurisdiction proper under one of the FSIA exceptions, courts generally will not
subject foreign sovereigns to jurisdictional discovery.' 56
However, the court in Intelsat Global Sales and Marketing, Ltd. v.
153. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438. 443 (D.C. Cir.
1990); see also Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 531 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("United
States Courts of Appeal do not ordinarily have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals .. . such as the denial of a motion to dismiss. But when such a denial subjects
a foreign sovereign to jurisdiction, the order is 'subject to interlocutory appeal
under the collateral order doctrine"') (citations omitted).
154. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 563 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (citations omitted).
155. Id. (quoting El- FadI v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
156. See also Intelsat Global Sales & Mktg., Ltd. v. Community of Yugoslav Posts Telephones & Telegraphs, 534 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2008) ("At minimum, a plaintiff must allege some facts upon which jurisdiction could be found after discovery
is completed") (citations omitted).
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Community of Yugoslav Posts Telegraphs & Telephones15 7 adopted a
more lenient, plaintiff-friendly approach. In that case, the defendant argued that it was not an "organ" of a foreign state as the plaintiff alleged,
but the D.C. Circuit held that limited jurisdictional discovery should be
permitted where the plaintiff had made non-conclusory allegations that
jurisdiction was proper, and there was a likelihood that discovery might
8
assist the court in making a decision regarding immunity.' 5

E.

REMOVAL

Under certain circumstances, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), a defendant may remove a case filed against it from state to federal court, 15 9 as
long as it does so within thirty days. But where the defendant is a foreign
state under the FSIA, Congress has allowed for greater leniency, providing expressly that the removal period may be extended for cause. 160 The
majority of litigation over this issue in 2008 centered around what constitutes sufficient "cause" to justify removal by a foreign state after the
thirty-day time limit. Courts in 2008 identified specific factors that district courts should consider when answering this question.
In Big Sky Network Canada, Ltd. v. Sichuan ProvincialGovernment,16 1
the Tenth Circuit addressed this issue for the first time. The court held
that mere sovereign status does not entitle the defendant to an extension.
Rather, the foreign sovereign bears the burden of establishing an "affirmative" and "meaningful" justification for its delay. The court set forth
four factors to consider when deciding a foreign sovereign's request to
extend the time period for removal: (1) the danger of prejudice to the
nonmoving party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on
judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the
sovereign acted in good faith. 162
The Eastern District for New York outlined a similar test for determining whether to permit a foreign sovereign's removal after the thirty-day
time limit: "[S]ome of the factors to consider [are] the purpose of the
removal statute, the extent of prior activity in the state system, the
prejudice to both parties, the effect on the substantive rights of the parties and any intervening equities . .. [alnother factor is the failure of ser157. 534 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
158. Doe v. Bin Laden, 580 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.D.C. 2008) ("[A] court should allow
for limited jurisdictional discovery if a plaintiff shows a nonconclusory basis for
asserting jurisdiction and a likelihood that additional supplemental facts will make
jurisdiction proper") (citations omitted).
159. Although the vast majority of cases against foreign sovereigns are brought in the
federal courts, in some instances litigants have chosen to pursue actions in the state
courts as well. See, e.g., Hyundai Corp. v. Republic of Iraq, 794 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st
Dep't 2005).
160. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d).
161. 533 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2008).
162. Id. at 1186-87 (citations omitted).
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vice of process to conform to the requirements of FSIA."16 3

F.

DEFAULT JUDGMENTS

If a foreign sovereign is properly served with a complaint but refuses to
answer, move or otherwise respond, the court may, in its discretion, grant
a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff.T M Such judgments are not
uncommon in foreign sovereign litigation, as foreign states often choose
to ignore claims asserted against them in U.S. courts, for political, economic, practical, or other reasons.
The standard for a default judgment under the FSIA affords substantial
discretion to the trial courts. The statute merely establishes that "[n]o
judgment by default shall be entered .. , against a foreign state, a political
subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state,
unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence
satisfactory to the court."' 65 Moreover, in evaluating whether a plaintiff
has established a claim or right to relief against a foreign state, "the court
may accept as true the plaintiffs' uncontroverted evidence, including
proof by affidavit."' 6 6
While this standard may appear plaintiff-friendly, courts also continue
to recognize the time-honored theory that "the interests of justice are
best served by trials on the merits, not by default."'16 7 Thus, even when
courts do grant default judgments, it is often only after a thorough analysis of the plaintiff's claims. For example, in Lasheen v. Loomis Co.,' 6 8 the
court considered the following factors: (1) the possibility of prejudice to
the plaintiff if the judgment were not entered; (2) the merits of plaintiff's
substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of
money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning
the material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect;
and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
favoring decisions on the merits.
Several courts in 2008 denied default judgment motions by plaintiffs
who-despite the liberal standard-failed to convince the court sufficiently
of their entitlement to judgment on the merits against absent foreign sovereigns.' 6 9 And still other courts set aside previously entered default
163. James v. Government of St. Lucia, No. 08-CV-0067, 2008 WL 4410959, *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2008).
164. See, e.g., Lasheen v. Loomis Co., No. 01-0227, 2008 WL 2880408, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
July 22, 2008).

165. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e).

166. Saludes v. Republica de Cuba, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1246 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
167. Tohme v. Sebaaly, No. 07-10989, 2008 WL 878770, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2008)
(citing United Coin Meter v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 846 (6th Cir.
1983)).
168. No. 01-0227, 2008 WL 2880408, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2008).
169. See, e.g., Jin v. Ministry of State Security, 557 F. Supp. 2d 131 (D.D.C. 2008) (refusing to enter default judgment because plaintiffs' pleadings did not sufficiently
prove that the foreign sovereign fell within the commercial activity exception, or
that it had interfered with the plaintiff's contract); Almon v. Caplan, No. 2:0710219, 2008 WL 3010619 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2008).
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judgments upon the defendant's request, demonstrating their preference
1 70
for resolving the case on the merits. For example, in Tohme v. Sebaaly,
the Eastern District of Michigan district court granted a foreign sovereign's request to set aside a default judgment, because (1) the sovereign's
delay in answering the complaint did not prejudice the plaintiff; (2) the
sovereign eventually filed an answer, albeit untimely, raising several affirmative defenses; and (3) there was no evidence that the foreign sovereign had intended to thwart the judicial proceedings, or was reckless in
disregarding the effect of its conduct on the proceedings.
Thus, while courts are willing and able to grant default judgments
against foreign sovereigns that choose not to participate in U.S. litigation,
courts have continued to demonstrate reluctance to render final judgment
in the absence of the sovereign defendants.

G.

RELATED JURISPRUDENTIAL AND JURISDIcTiONAL ISSUES

The FSIA is not the only basis on which a U.S. court may decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign defendant or to allow the
case to proceed to the merits. The following are some examples of other
jurisprudential and jurisdictional considerations addressed by courts in
2008 that may lead a court to decline to hear a claim against a foreign
sovereign.]
Political Question Doctrine. Two notable FSIA cases in 2008 considered the application of the political question doctrine to bar claims
against foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts. In each case, the court looked
to statements by the Executive Branch to determine whether allowing the
case to continue would seriously impede United States foreign policy
interests.
In Freund v. Republic of France,17 1 the Southern District of New York
found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a claim brought under the
takings exception to the FSIA by Holocaust survivors against France, the
Socidtd Nationale des Chemins de Fer Franqais (SNCF), and the Caisse
des Ddp6ts et Consignations (CDC). The court also found that, even if it
had jurisdiction over the claim, abstention was appropriate under the political question doctrine and for reasons of international comity.
The court found abstention appropriate under the political question
doctrine based on one of the tests enumerated by the Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr,'7 2 explaining that "[u]nder the fourth Baker test, a 'lack of
respect' to the Executive Branch would result if the Court were to disregard the Executive's declared preference" to resolve these claims 'outside
of litigation. "'17 3 The United States had filed a Statement of Interest in
the case recommending dismissal "on any valid legal ground."'17 4 The
170. No. 07-10989, 2008 WL 878770,

at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2008).

171. 592 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
112. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
173. Id. at 572.
174. Id.

at 557, 573.
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United States had previously entered into an Executive Agreement with
France which stated that it was in the interests of the two nations to establish a mechanism to resolve claims by Holocaust survivors and their
heirs that was "non-adversarial and non-confrontational, and outside of
litigation." 175 The Agreement represented an effort by the U.S. and
France to ensure prompt compensation for Holocaust victims through a
commission France had established in 1999. In the Agreement, the parties agreed to dismiss pending expropriation claims against French banks.
Because of the interests expressed by the United States and its unequivocal recommendation of dismissal, the court found abstention appropriate.
The court further found that international comity required it to abstain
from hearing the case because there were parallel proceedings before an
adequate forum, the French commission on Holocaust compensation,
76
with "'substantially the same"'~ parties.'1
In Simon v. Republic of Iraq, the D.C. Circuit found abstention inappropriate under the political question doctrine where defendants had not
met the burden of demonstrating a clear conflict between United States
foreign policy interests and claims brought by U.S. citizens against Kuwait
and Iraq. 17 7 Iraq argued that the court should abstain from hearing the
claims because allowing the case to proceed would be contrary to United
States foreign policy. It cited a number of statements made by the U.S.
President in support of its argument. The court rejected Iraq's arguments, noting that the mere assertion that a claim might affect United
States foreign relations was insufficient to warrant abstention under the
78
political question doctrine.'1
Forum Non Conveniens. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
a U.S. court may decline to hear a claim if accepting the claim would
impose a serious inconvenience on the defendant and there exists an adequate alternative forum. In 2008, several courts addressed the question
of what order to consider arguments based on sovereign immunity and
other jurisprudential grounds for dismissal-a question that could impact
significantly a foreign sovereign's litigation burdens from an early stage.
79
a District of
In MBI Group, Inc. v. Crgdit Foncier du Cameroun,'1

Columbia federal district court held that a case may be dismissed on
grounds of forum non con veniens without reaching the question of
whether there is jurisdiction under the FSIA. This decision highlights potential tensions between a defendant's sovereign immunity, on the one
hand, and a plaintiff's choice of forum, on the other. Relying on D.C.
Circuit case law holding that jurisdictional discovery should not be authorized in FSIA cases where the defendant has raised other jurisdictional objections, the district court concluded that a court may dismiss a
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 564.
Id. at 575.
529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009).
Id. at 1197.
558 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008).
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case based on forum non con veniens grounds before addressing the immunity issue, particularly where the case raises difficult issues that might
require jurisdictional discovery. 180 Thus, the court spared the defendant
from first having to submit to costly and time-consuming discovery to
resolve the question of its sovereign status.
In contrast, both the District Court for the Western District of Texas
and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, analyzing their jurisdiction in the
traditional order, started with a jurisdictional analysis under the FSIA
and only then considered whether dismissal based on forum non conveniens was appropriate. 8 1 In both cases, the courts declined to dismiss
based on forum non con veniens, holding that, while there were adequate
alternative fora, the balance of private and public interest factors did not
strongly favor dismissal. 182 The Texas court particularly emphasized the
fact that dismissal for forum non con veniens should be the exception
rather than the rule given the importance of respecting the plaintiff's
choice of forum. 1 83 Thus, in these cases, the plaintiff was able to force the
defendant to submit to jurisdictional discovery to decide the sovereign
immunity issue.
It remains an open question how courts will address requests by sovereign (or alleged sovereign) entities to dismiss their cases on other grounds
without forcing them first to endure the burdens of providing their sovereign status, or even jurisdictional discovery, at the outset of the case.

180. Id. at 27.
181. See, e.g., UNC Lear Services, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. SA 04 CA
1008-WRF, 2008 WL 2946059 (W.D. Tex. July 25, 2008); Agudas Chasidei Chabad
of U.S. v. Russian Federation, 528 F.3d 934 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
182. See id.
183. UNG Lear, 2008 WL 2946059, at *20.
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